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Summary. Ballot initiatives allow the public to vote directly on public policy. The literature in
political science has attempted to document whether the presence of an initiative can increase
voter turnout. We study this question for an initiative that appeared on the ballot in 2008 in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, using a natural experiment based on geography.This form of natural ex-
periment exploits variation in geography where units in one geographic area receive a treatment
whereas units in another area do not. When assignment to treatment via geographic location
creates as-if random variation in treatment assignment, adjustment for baseline covariates is
unnecessary. In many applications, however, some adjustment for baseline covariates may be
necessary. As such, analysts may wish to combine identification strategies—using both spatial
proximity and covariates. We propose a matching framework to incorporate information about
both geographic proximity and observed covariates flexibly which allows us to minimize spatial
distance while preserving balance on observed covariates.This framework is also applicable to
regression discontinuity designs that are not based on geography. We find that the initiative on
the ballot in Milwaukee does not appear to have increased turnout.
Keywords: Ballot initiative; Matching; Regression discontinuity design
1. Introduction
In 24 of the states in the USA, citizens can place legislative statutes directly on the ballot for
passage by the electorate. In the political science literature, these ballot initiatives are believed to
increase voter turnout by stimulating voters’ interest in the election. Early work, however, found
little evidence that initiatives increased turnout (Everson, 1981; Magleby, 1984). Although later
research did ﬁnd a positive correlation between ballot initiatives and turnout (Tolbert et al.,
2001; Smith and Tolbert, 2004), some stipulated that the effect was conditional on the type of
election (Daniel and Yohai, 2008). All these studies, however, relied on comparisons between
states with and without the initiatives process and are therefore subject to confounding from
state level factors such as election administration laws and political culture. We revisit this
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question by studying the turnout effects of a municipal level ballot initiative in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, an intervention that is assigned on the basis of geography and allows us to avoid
cross-state comparisons. Treatments that vary with geography are especially common in federal
systems where subnational government units such as states, counties or municipalities often
have considerable latitude in the adoption of speciﬁc policies. Understanding the effects of such
treatments often must rely on observational studies since experimentation may be infeasible.
Any research design that is intended to make inferences about the effects of geographically
varying treatments must compare units in the treated area with units in a control area.
One possible research design states that, conditionally on a set of observed pretreatment
covariates, the entire treated and control areas are comparable, and uses statisticalmethods such
as matching or regression to adjust for these measured covariates (Keele and Titiunik, 2013a).
The risk with this design is that unmeasured confounders may bias the treatment effect estimate.
An alternative research design exploits geographic proximity. If units sort around a boundary
between treated and control areas with error or the boundary between treated and control areas
is drawn arbitrarily, a local treatment effect is identiﬁable under a regression discontinuity (RD)
framework (Keele and Titiunik, 2013b). Under this design, treated and control groups near the
boundary are good counterfactuals for each other because placement in the treated or control
areas can be thought to be ‘as if random’ very near the boundary. We explore how analysts
might blend these two designs and base inferences on observations that are
(a) in a small neighbourhood around the geographic boundary that separates treatment and
control areas and
(b) still require adjustment for pretreatment covariates.
In applications where the assumptions behind this combined strategy are plausible, researchers
can use it to obtain estimates of the treatment effect of interest in a neighbourhood around
the boundary. We implement this design by using matching, an intuitive and ﬂexible form of
statistical adjustment that can easily accommodate our combined design.
The data that are analysed in the paper and the programs that were used to analyse them can
be obtained from
http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/rss-datasets
2. The 2008 initiative in Milwaukee
We study the effect of ballot initiatives on voter turnout through an analysis of the initiative
process in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where the city has the initiative process but the state of Wis-
consin does not. In 2008, a coalition of local labour, educational and community organizations
led by the National Association of Working Women helped to place an initiative on the ballot
that mandated all private employers in the city of Milwaukee to provide 1 h of sick leave for
every 30 h worked. The initiative passed receiving slightly more than 68% of the vote, but it
was struck down by the courts shortly after the election. On the countywide ballot, citizens also
voted on a sales tax increase which also passed.
Fig. 1 contains a map ofMilwaukee county. The area in yellow comprises the city ofMilwau-
kee which is surrounded by 17 suburban areas that are considered minor civil divisions—the
equivalent of a municipality—by the US Census Bureau. The paid sick leave initiative appeared
on the ballot in the city of Milwaukee (the area in yellow) but was not on the ballot in any of
the surrounding suburbs (the area in blue).
Basic comparisons of Milwaukee with the suburban municipalities that surround it demon-
strate that the city is more ethnically diverse, has lower housing prices and lower socio-economic
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Fig. 1. Milwaukee metropolitan area within Milwaukee county: the ballot initiative of interest was placed on
the ballot within the city of Milwaukee ( ); suburbs to the city ( ) did not have the initiative on the ballot; areas
outside Milwaukee ( ) did not have any initiatives on the ballot (the figure indicates areas where legislative
districts straddle the city limit ( ))
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status. Using census data from 2000, we observe that the median household income in Mil-
waukee is just under $34000, whereas it is nearly $54000 in the suburbs. The percentage of
African-American residents of voting age in Milwaukee is 29%, whereas it is less than 1.5% in
the suburbs. The difference in median housing value is nearly $60000. Nearly 21% of residents
in the suburbs have a college degree whereas just over 12% in the city do.Moreover, examination
of State Assembly, State Senate and US House district maps in Milwaukee county reveals that
most of the Milwaukee city limit is used as a boundary between legislative districts. There are
only two areas where the same State Assembly, State Senate and US House districts contain
both treated and control voters from the city and suburbs. This suggests that state legislators
use the city limit to separate voters. In Fig. 1, we highlight the areas where legislative districts
straddle the city limit by using diagonally shaded areas on the map.
2.1. Data: covariates, housing values and distances
Our main source of data is the Wisconsin voter ﬁle, which is the database of registered vot-
ers maintained by the state of Wisconsin for administrative purposes. This ﬁle contains date
of birth, gender, voting history, voters’ addresses and the legislative districts in which each
voter’s address is included. We also acquired county records for the nearly 30000 houses that
were sold in Milwaukee county from 2006 to 2008, including house characteristics and sales
price.
To determine distances between voters, we converted each voter’s address into latitude and
longitude co-ordinates, which we then used to calculate the spatial distance between voters’
residences. We also calculated for each voter the median value of houses sold within a 500-m
radius of her residence; we use this as a voter level measure of housing values. Finally, we
recorded each voter as either residing in the treated area—Milwaukee—or residing in the control
area—one of the Milwaukee suburbs—on the basis of their address in the voter ﬁle.
3. Statistical framework and designs
Weadopt the potential outcomes framework and assume that unit j has two potential outcomes,
YTj and YCj, which correspond to levels of treatment Zj = 1 and Zj = 0 respectively. In our
geographic context, we compare units in a treated area with units in a control area, which we
denote by AT and AC respectively; thus, Zj = 1 when j is within AT and Zj = 0 when j is
within AC. Units also have a vector of covariates Xj determined before treatment is assigned.
The triplet of observed random variables is .Yj,Zj,Xj/. The individual level treatment effect
is YTj −YCj, the observed outcome is Yj =ZjYTj + .1−Zj/YCj and the fundamental problem
of causal inference is that we cannot observe both YTj and YCj simultaneously for any given
unit (Rubin, 1974; Holland, 1986; Neyman, 1990). Nonetheless, different identiﬁable estimands
based on aggregates or averages can be deﬁned; in Section 5, we focus on the attributable
effect. We assume the stable unit treatment value assumption throughout, i.e. that the potential
outcomes of one unit do not depend on the treatment status of other units (Cox, 1958; Rubin,
1986).
In our application, the most plausible form of interference would occur if voters in the treated
area encouraged their neighbours in control areas to vote because of the enthusiasm that is
induced by the ballot initiative. However, a recent experiment on voter turnout found little
evidence of treatment spillovers even within households (Sinclair et al., 2012), so we suspect that
there will be little interference across voters even when the households are adjacent. Moreover,
a stable unit treatment value assumption violation of this kind would tend to bias the effect
towards 0, so any positive effects should be conservative estimates.
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3.1. Design 1: conditioning on observables
The ﬁrst design that we consider is based on the assumption that treatment is ignorable condi-
tionally on a set of observed covariates.
Assumption 1 (conditional geographic treatment ignorability). The potential outcomes are
independent of treatment assignment conditional on observed covariates Xj, i.e. .YTj,YCj/⊥⊥
Zj|Xj.
We assume that Xj does not include any measures of distance to the boundary between AC
and AT. If assumption 1 holds, statistical inferences can be obtained in a straightforward way
after adjusting for observed differences. There is, however, no a priori reason to suspect that the
geographic variation of treatment will justify this assumption, and we suspect that unobserved
confounders will contribute to why someone might live in the city of Milwaukee as opposed to
one of its immediate suburbs.
3.2. Design 2: the geographic regression discontinuity design
An alternative design uses adjacent areas and exploits spatial proximity to the border between
AC and AT, under the assumption that units either select locations around this boundary
with error or the boundary is drawn in a haphazard fashion, unrelated to the units’ charac-
teristics. In this design, every unit j can be thought of as having a score or running variable
Sj = .Sj1,Sj2/ that uniquely deﬁnes its geographic location and allows us to compute its dis-
tance to any point .b1, b2/ on the boundary. Assignment of treatment Zj is then a determin-
istic function of this score, which has a discontinuity at the known boundary between AC
and AT. This is a form of RD design, in which units are assigned to treatment or control
groups on the basis of whether their value of an observed covariate exceeds a known cut-off.
The RD design was ﬁrst introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960), and the seminal
paper by Hahn et al. (2001) provided identiﬁcation results. See Imbens and Lemieux (2008)
and Lee and Lemieux (2010) for reviews, and Calonico et al. (2013) for recent results in robust
non-parametric inference of RD effects. Hereafter, we refer to this design as the geographic RD
design following Keele and Titiunik (2013b), where this design is discussed in detail. Identiﬁ-
cation of the average treatment effect at the boundary in the geographic RD design is based
primarily on the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (continuity in two-dimensional score). The conditional regression functions
E{YCj|.S1,S2/} and E{YTj|.S1,S2/} are continuous in .S1,S2/ at all points .b1,b2/ on the
boundary.
Identiﬁcation under assumption 2 requires that people cannot precisely self-select locations
around the boundary in a way that makes potential outcomes discontinuous. The validity of
this assumption may be threatened since people often select their place of residence on the
basis of administrative boundaries. For example, the quality of schools may vary sharply from
one school district to the next, and many people use this information when choosing where
to buy a house. In Milwaukee, there is no place along the border where the boundaries of
school districts do not perfectly coincide with the Milwaukee city limit—i.e. every suburb
has its own school district. If residence in a given school district affected voter turnout, this
would threaten identiﬁcation. However, if we believed that school district is correlated with
voter turnout only because of its correlation with income, and we believed that income varies
smoothly at the boundary, then identiﬁcation of the treatment effect of interest would still be
possible.
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3.3. Design 3: conditioning on observables and the discontinuity
When there appears to be strong self-selection around the border of interest, one alternative is
to combine designs and to assume that, after conditioning on covariates, treatment assignment
is as-if randomized for those who live near the city limit. Thus, we propose a combined design,
where geographic distance between treated and control observations is minimized while balance
in pretreatment covariates is also enforced. To formalize this idea, we let N.b1,b2/ collect the set
of co-ordinates corresponding to a small geographic neighbourhood around each point .b1,b2/
on the boundary between AT and AC. We assume that there is a small neighbourhood where
potential outcomes and treatment assignment are conditionally independent given predeter-
mined covariates.
Assumption 3 (conditional geographic treatment ignorability in local neighbourhood). For
each point .b1,b2/ on the boundary, there is a neighbourhood N.b1,b2/ such that .YTj,YCj/⊥
Zj|Xj for all j with .Sj1,Sj2/ in N.b1, b2/.
This assumption is in the spirit of an interpretation that was developed by Lee (2008), who
argued that RD designs can be seen as local experiments near the cut-off where treatment status
changes. A formalization of this local randomization idea within a randomization inference
framework for the standardRDdesignwas proposed byCattaneo et al. (2013). The combination
of designs that we propose generalizes and expands these ideas to consider a small geographic
neighbourhood around the boundary that separates the treatment and control areas, where
an as-if randomization or independence condition holds after conditioning on predetermined
covariates—but possibly does not hold unconditionally as in the standard interpretation.
This design takes from a geographic RD design based on assumption 2 the notion that the
treated and control groups will be valid counterfactuals as the score approaches the cut-off
and from a selection on observables assumption the notion that valid counterfactuals can only
be obtained after conditioning pretreatment covariates. Note that assumption 3 is weaker than
assumption 1 (because it requires conditional independence for only a subset of the population),
but it is not necessarily weaker than assumption 2.Note that, whereas assumption 2 is concerned
with identiﬁcation of a treatment effect only at each boundary point, assumption 3 would allow
for identiﬁcation of the treatment effect not only at these boundary points, but also at all internal
points included in the geographic neighbourhood where it holds. Therefore, design 3 will not
be always preferable to design 2. But, when the assumptions behind design 3 hold, making
inferences based on this design will allow for estimation of the treatment effect for a (small)
geographic area around the boundary that separates treated and control areas, as opposed to
only at this boundary. Assumption 3 might be plausible when treatment assignment is based
on geography, as subjects are typically strategic in choosing where to reside but within small
geographic areas may base their strategic decisions in observable quantities such as housing
prices and neighbourhood amenities.
Using our application, Fig. 2 illustrates a situation in which design 3may be plausibly invoked
by showing the treated–control mean differences in house prices as distance to the Milwaukee
city limit decreases. Here, each treated voter is matched with the control voter who is
geographically closest to her—but no predetermined covariates are used to form thematches. As
can be seen, even though the difference in house prices decreases approximately monotonically
with geographic distance, it remains signiﬁcantly different from0even for the smallest distanceof
50m. In this case, we believe that house prices, andmore generally income, are highly correlated
with turnout. Given that covariate balance improves as we near the city limit, but since those
imbalances are not entirely removed, this provides a reason to invoke design 3. In our analysis
under design 3 that is presented below, we invoke assumption 3 including house prices in the
Enhancing a Geographic Regression Discontinuity Design through Matching 229
Mean CoMean Tr
●
1000 meter buffer
119.183.7
●
750 meter buffer
117.984.7
●
500 meter buffer
116.685.2
●
400 meter buffer
11785.1
●
300 meter buffer
117.885.4
●
200 meter buffer
117.189.3
●
100 meter buffer
117.992.4
●
50 meter buffer
117.895
−35 −30 −25 −20
Difference−in−means
Fig. 2. Difference in means () in house prices at the individual level between treatment and control groups
for various buffers around the Milwaukee city limit, matching on geographic distance within each buffer: a
buffer is a narrow band around the border; a 100-m buffer is a band that extends 100 m from either side of
the city limits; units are in thousands of dollars (—, 95% confidence intervals based on paired t-tests)
conditioning set Xj, which entails assuming that the unobservables (the variables that are not in
Xj) follow a pattern similar to that in Fig. 2, except that their differences do eventually vanish
near the city limit.
4. A matching framework to combine designs
We propose a matching framework to implement design 3 and combine the identiﬁcation strate-
gies based on observed covariates and geographic distances. Although our application is charac-
terized by a geographic discontinuity, this matching framework readily generalizes to standard
(i.e. non-geographic) RD designs. To implement design 3, one possibility would be to use stan-
dard matching methods and to ﬁnd close matches on some covariate distance while considering
geographic proximity as an additional covariate. For this task, we could use various matching
algorithms, although with most types it would be difﬁcult to enforce different forms of balance
on different covariates.
Matching via integer programming allows us to enforce different formsof balance for different
covariates (Zubizarreta et al., 2013). In applications, there are typically key discrete covariates
on which we may need to match exactly; other covariates of secondary importance on which
we may wish to match with ﬁne balance (i.e. to balance their marginal distributions exactly in
aggregate but without constraining who is matched to whom); and there are other covariates
for which wemay want to minimize only differences in means. See Rosenbaum et al. (2007) for a
discussion of ﬁne balance and Rosenbaum (2010), part II, for a discussion of different forms of
covariate balance. With integer programming, we can ﬂexibly match subjects in the treated and
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control areas tominimize their relative geographic distances while also balancing their observed
covariates with different forms of balance.
However, it may be that for a given treated unit there is no control unit that is both near in
geographic distance and satisﬁes the balance constraints; this is known as a lack of common
support.A caliper is onemethod that couldbeused to ensure that common support holds.With a
caliper, if amatch cannotbemadewithin some tolerance, the treatedunit that cannot bematched
is discarded. The difﬁculty with a caliper is that treated units are not discarded in an optimal
fashion. To deal with this problem, we apply the technique of optimal subset matching which
optimally seeks to retain the largest number of treated subjects for which common support holds
(Rosenbaum, 2012). For that, our matching framework implements optimal subset matching
using integer programming to select the maximum number of matched pairs in relation to their
total sum of distances that satisﬁes the balance constraints that were described above.
4.1. Optimal subset matching with integer programming
Let jt index the subjects in the treated area AT, and similarly let jc index the subjects in AC.
Deﬁne djt,jc as the geographic distance between treated unit jt and control jc. To enforce speciﬁc
forms of covariate balance, deﬁne e∈E as the index of the covariates for which it is needed to
match exactly, and be ∈Be as the categories that covariate e takes, so that xjt;e is the value of
nominal covariate e for treated unit jt with xjt;e ∈Be. Similarly, deﬁne f ∈F as the index of
the nominal covariates for which it is required to match with ﬁne balance, and bf ∈Bf as the
categories of covariate f , with xjt;f , the value of covariate f for treated unit jt, and xjc;f , the
value of covariate f for treated unit jc ∈AC. Finally, let m∈M be the index of the covariates
for which it is desired to balance their means, so that xjt;m is the value of covariate m for treated
unit jt, and xjc;m is the value of covariate m for control jc.
To solve our problem optimally, we introduce binary decision variables
ajt,jc =
{
1 if treated unitjt is matched to control unitjc,
0 otherwise,
and, for a given scalar λ, we minimize∑
jt∈AT
∑
jc∈AC
djt,jcajt,jc −λ
∑
jt∈AT
∑
jc∈AC
ajt,jc .1/
subject to pair matching and covariate balancing constraints. Under this penalized match, if
geographic distance can be minimized it will be, and, if it cannot be minimized in every case, it
will be minimized as often as possible. In particular, the pair matching constraints require each
treated and control subject to be matched at most once,∑
jc∈AC
ajt,jc 1, ∀jt ∈AT, .2/
∑
jt∈AT
ajt,jc 1, ∀jc ∈AC: .3/
This implies thatwematchwithout replacement,whichwedo to simplify inference.The covariate
balancing constraints are deﬁned as follows:∑
jt∈AT
∑
jc∈AC
|1{xjt ;e=be}xjt;e −1{xjc;e=be}xjc;e|ajt,jc =0, ∀e∈E , .4/
∑
jt∈AT
∑
jc∈AC
ajt,jc 1{xjt ;f =bf } −
∑
jt∈AT
∑
jc∈AC
ajt,jc 1{xjc;f =bf } =0, ∀bf ∈Bf , f∈F , .5/
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jt∈AT
∑
jc∈AC
ajt,jcxjt;m −
∑
jt∈AT
∑
jc∈AC
ajt,jcxjc;m
∣∣∣ "m ∑
jt∈AT
∑
jc∈AC
ajt,jc , ∀m∈M, .6/
where 1 is the indicator function.
Constraints (4), (5) and (6) enforce exactmatching, ﬁnebalance andmeanbalance respectively.
More precisely, constraint (4) requires exact matching on the covariates e∈E by matching each
treated subject to a control with the same values for the covariates in E ; constraint (5) constrains
themarginal distributions of the covariates inF to be exactly balanced in aggregate, but without
constraining who is matched to whom; and ﬁnally constraint (6) forces the differences in means
after matching to be less than or equal to the scalar "m for all m∈M. See Zubizarreta (2012) for
a discussion of these and other covariate balance constraints in the context of a more general
mixed integer programme. Generally, the covariates on which we wish to match exactly, with
ﬁne balance and mean balance, and the allowed discrepancy in means as represented by the
scalar "m, should be chosen by the analyst on the basis of substantive knowledge of the problem
at hand.
We incorporated optimal subset matching into the integer programming framework in the
objective function (1) via the λ-parameter. The ﬁrst term in equation (1) is the total sum of
geographic distances betweenmatchedpairs, and the second term is the total number ofmatched
pairs. Therefore, λ emphasizes the total number of matched pairs in relation to the total sum of
distances and, according to equation (1), it is preferable to match additional pairs if on average
they are at a smaller distance than λ. In our application, we choose λ to be equal to the median
geographic distance between treated and control subjects so, according to equation (1), it is
preferable to match additional pairs if on average they are at a smaller distance than the typical
distance (as measured by the median). Subject to the pair matching constraints (2) and (3) and
the covariate balancing constraints (4)–(6), this form of penalized optimization addresses the
lack of common support problem in the distribution of observed covariates of the treated and
control groups.
Including this penalty allows us to keep the largest number ofmatchedpairs forwhichdistance
is minimized and the balance constraints are satisﬁed. This implies that, as we alter the distances
or the balance constraints, the number of treated and control subjects retained changes. In
particular, for stricter constraints we tend to retain a smaller number of subjects. Although this
is not ideal, discarding observations to deal with samples that have limited overlap is a common
practice (Crump et al., 2009).
4.2. Three matched designs
We illustrate each of the designs that were discussed above with three different matching proce-
dures. Throughout we use the R package mipmatch (Zubizarreta, 2012). For all three matches,
we ﬁrst restrict our comparisons to treated and control voters who reside in the same leg-
islative districts—the red diagonally shaded areas in Fig. 1. Given that state legislators often
draw legislative districts on the basis of the city limit, these districts are themselves important
covariates. Therefore, wematch exactly on the legislative districts: legislative district exact match
I includes only treated and control voters in the fourth US Congressional district, the seventh
State Senate district and the 20th State Assembly district, and legislative district exact match II
includes only treated and control voters in the fourth US Congressional district, the ﬁfth State
Senate district and the 15th State Assembly district. As we show in the on-line supplemental
appendix, exact matching on legislative districts signiﬁcantly decreases covariate imbalance.
Within each triplet of State Assembly, State Senate and USHouse districts, we restricted all our
analyses to observations within 750 m of the Milwaukee city limit. As a practical matter, we
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also exactly matched on gender to ease the computation. Once we exactly match on legislative
districts, gender is balanced, so differences in this covariate should have no effect on thematched
estimates.
4.2.1. Design 1: a conventional matching on covariates
The ﬁrst match, based on design 1, balances observable covariates, ignoring geographic dis-
tances. The covariate distances between units were obtained from a rank-based Mahalanobis
distancematrix (seeRosenbaum (2010), section 8.3).We also imposed some balance constraints.
For each voter, we have binary indicators for whether they voted in 2004 and 2006, which we
used to create a ﬁve-level categorical measure of voting history. See the on-line appendix for
details on how we constructed this measure. We match exactly on each of these categories since
we suspect that voting history is of critical importance. We constrained the means of age and
housing value to differ by less than 1 year and $1000 respectively between the treated and control
areas. Although the constraint on housing prices forces the mean differences to be similar, we
also want the distribution of housing values across the treated and control groups to be similar.
We therefore enforced a ﬁne balance constraint on housing values so that house prices have the
same distribution in treated and control groups without constraining how units are matched.
We matched with ﬁne balance for seven categories of housing prices to capture the somewhat
long tail in the upper end of the distribution.
4.2.2. Design 2: geographic distance matching
The secondmatchhews as closely as possible to the geographicRDdesignwhere only geographic
distance is needed for identiﬁcation. Therefore, for the voters in the two overlapping legislative
district triplets, we minimized the total sum of geographic distances between matched pairs. We
also modiﬁed the distances djt,jc to penalize matching subjects residing at more than 2 km of
distance. The question is whether imbalances remain in observed covariates once geographic
distance has been minimized in the matches.
4.2.3. Design 3: combining geographic distance and covariates
The last matching implements design 3 using the integer programming optimalmatching frame-
work thatwas described above. The algorithmminimized geographic distances betweenmatched
pairs as in design 2 while matching for sex, age, voting history and housing values in the same
manner as in design 1.
4.3. Three matched comparisons
Table 1 shows housing prices and geographic distances for a design where we exactly match
only on legislative districts and sex, and for the three matching designs, for both legislative
district triplets. Table 1 shows means and absolute standardized differences in means (differ-
ences in means divided by the pooled standard deviation between groups before matching) for
housing prices, and average andmedian geographic distances between treated andmatched con-
trol voters. When evaluating covariate balance, we focus on housing prices because they reﬂect
important neighbourhood characteristics such as quality of schools, safety and household
income. The importance of housing prices is discussed in detail in the hedonic pricing literature,
where house values are used to infer the implicit prices of housing attributes and environmental
characteristics (see Malpezzi (2002) for a review). The on-line appendix contains additional
balance test results.
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Table 1. Design comparison for covariate balance in three matched comparisons†
Design House value ($) Distance (km)
Mean Mean Absolute Median Mean Pairs
treated control standardized
difference
Legislative district exact match I
Unmatched 167458 157663 0.44 3.72 3.54 —
1, covariates-only match 156070 157051 0.04 2.87 3.28 2704
2, distance-only match 164070 151135 0.56 0.88 1.04 2524
3, covariates and distance match 154259 153261 0.04 0.88 1.02 1939
Legislative district exact match II
Unmatched 158567 144692 0.69 6.58 5.78 —
1, covariates-only match 144926 144692 0.01 7.72 5.80 1667
2, distance-only match 136049 144802 0.43 1.87 1.68 1663
3, covariates and distance match 140725 141720 0.05 1.96 1.80 536
†For all designs, exact matching was done on sex, Congressional district, State Senate district and State Assembly
district, andonly forobservationswithin750mof theborderof each legislativedistrict triplet.Design1additionally
matches exactly on voting history; it also constrains the means of age and housing price to be less than or equal
to 1 year and $1000 respectively and matches with ﬁne balance for seven categories of housing price all the while
minimizing the total sum of covariate distances based on a rank-basedMahalanobis distance within pairs. Design
2 minimizes the total sum of geographic distances between matched pairs. Design 3 minimizes the total sum
of geographic distances between matched pairs while also matching on the same covariates as in design 1. In
legislative district exact match I, all voters are in the fourth Congressional district, the seventh State Senate district
and the 20th State Assembly district. In legislative district exact match II, all voters are in the fourth Congressional
district, the ﬁfth State Senate district and the 13th State Assembly district. Distance is from the control voter’s
residence to the treated voter’s residence measured in kilometres. In the unmatched designs, ‘Pairs’ shows the
available number of pairs based on the total number of treated units; the original number of controls is 7396 in
legislative district exact match I and 9089 in legislative district exact match II.
In legislative district exact match I, the median distance between treated and control obser-
vations in the unmatched data is a little more than 112 km. House prices in design 1 are very well
balanced, with average house prices differing by just $500. This improved covariate balance,
however, comes at the expense of distance. In design 1, where covariate imbalance is minimized
without regard to geographic distance, the median distance between matched pairs is nearly
3 km, a full kilometre larger than in the unmatched data. In design 2, which minimizes only
geographic distance, the median geographic distance is reduced to 0.88 km. But this improve-
ment in geographic distance comes at the expense of covariate balance: balance on housing
prices is now worse than in the unmatched data. For example, the mean difference in housing
values is slightly less than $10000 in the unmatched data, but in design 2 this difference increases
to nearly $13000. As shown in Table 2 in the on-line appendix, a similar pattern holds for age,
where mean differences also increase in design 2 relative to the unmatched data. Design 3,
however, enforces both restrictions simultaneously. The standardized difference for housing
value in design 3 equals that in design 2, whereas the median distance within matched pairs is
identical to that in design 2.
We see a very similar pattern in legislative district exact match II, which is shown in the
bottom panel of Table 1. Once again, design 1 reduces imbalance in housing prices relative to
the unmatched data set (the standardized difference is reduced by 97%), but at the price of
increasing the median distance between treated and controls from about 2 to 3.5 km. Although
design 2 decreases this median distance, it also increases the difference in house prices, with a
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 3. 10 pairs of matches randomly sampled from legislative district exact match I: (a) design 1, covari-
ates-only match; (b) design 2, distance-only match; (c) design 3, covariates and distance match
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standardized mean difference that is 430% larger than in design 1. Again, design 3 minimizes
these differences while also restricting the comparison to observations that are geographically
very close to each other; the difference in housing prices drops to less than $1000 whereas the
median distance within matched pairs exceeds that in design 2 by less than 110 th of a kilometre.
The matching results from the three different designs are illustrated in Fig. 3, which shows
10 matched pairs randomly chosen from each of the three designs in legislative district exact
match I. In the ﬁgures, the treated units are held ﬁxed, and we show how the distance to the
matched controls varies across the three designs. As seen in Fig. 3(a), when geographic distance
is not incorporated in the matching procedure, matched pairs in design 1 are far from each
other. Incorporating geographic distance leads to matched pairs that are much closer, as shown
in Fig. 3(b). When we match on both covariates and distance, the smaller distances remain as
seen in Fig. 3(c), but we also gain better balance in observables. Fig. 3(c) embodies the strategy
behind assumption 3, which makes comparisons conditional on important covariates between
units that are in a small geographic neighbourhood of the boundary. The matching procedure
that is implemented in design 3 can reduce both distance and covariate imbalance by discarding
observations from the analysis via the optimal subsetting. Whereas design 3 uses about 24%
fewer observations than design 1 in legislative district exact match I, it uses about 62% fewer
observations in legislative district exact match II. As mentioned above, this loss of observations
is expected given the stricter constraints that are imposed by design 3 and is necessary to ensure
that common support holds in our sample.
5. Estimating the effect of ballot initiatives on turnout and sensitivity to
unmeasured confounders
5.1. Effects, inference and sensitivity analysis with binary responses under
randomization inference
We estimate the effect of the Wisconsin ballot initiative on turnout. We use a randomization
inference framework, where potential outcomes are seen as ﬁxed quantities and the only source
of randomness is the assignment of treatment. The randomization-based framework requires
interpreting assumption 3 in terms of ﬁxed quantities, as in Cattaneo et al. (2013). We outline
this framework following Rosenbaum (2002a) and explain in detail how we conduct estimation
and inference. In our analysis, there are I matched pairs, i=1, : : : , I, with two subjects, j =1, 2:
one treated and one control for 2I total subjects. Treatment assignment, potential outcomes
and observed outcomes are respectively Zij, yTij, yCij and Yij—where we use lower-case letters
to denote ﬁxed variables. We write δ for the 2I-dimensional vector of treatment effects: δ=
.δ11, : : : , δI2/T. In this case, δij ∈ {−1, 0, 1} for each i, j pair, and below we test Fisher’s sharp
null hypothesis of no treatment effect on .yTij, yCij/ which stipulates that H0 :yTij =yCij for all
i and j and may be expressed as H0 :δ=0.
We test Fisher’s sharp null hypothesis by usingMcNemar’s test, which is based on the number
of discordant pairs inmatchedoutcomes. In the case ofmatchedpairswithbinary responses, pair
i is discordant if it contains exactly one person who voted, Yi1 +Yi2 =1. McNemar’s statistic is
the number of votes, T , among treated subjects in discordant pairs, T =Σi∈DΣ2j=1ZijYij, where
D is a set of indices for the IÅ I discordant pairs. Some of the votes that are recorded in T
may have been caused by the presence of the ballot initiative and others might have occurred
whether there was an initiative on the ballot or not. The unobservable quantity Tc =Σi,j ZijyCij
is the number of votes that would have occurred without an initiative on the ballot. Fisher’s
sharp null hypothesis, H0 : δ= 0, says that no votes were caused or prevented by the ballot
initiative, implying that T =Tc. Therefore, this hypothesis may be tested by comparing T with
236 L. Keele, R. Titiunik and J. R. Zubizarreta
the randomization distribution of Tc, which follows a binomial distribution with sample size IÅ
and probability of success 12 .
In an observational study,we can base a test of the sharp null hypothesis on the randomization
distribution of Tc (Rosenbaum, 2002b). The randomization distribution for Tc is valid if every
unit j in pair i has the same probability of receiving treatment, Pr.Zij = 1/= 12 . This mode of
treatment assignment would be true by construction in a pair-randomized experiment since
we would choose one unit at random from each pair to receive treatment. In our analysis, we
assume that this model of treatment assignment holds after conditioning onXj. Onemodel for a
sensitivity analysis of this assumption stipulates that 1=.1+Γ/ Pr.Zij =1|Xj/Γ=.1+Γ/ for
a speciﬁed value of Γ greater than 1, such that randomization with no hidden bias corresponds
to Γ=1; see Rosenbaum (2002a), chapter 4, for a discussion. We use values of Γ>1 to compute
a range of possible inferences, which indicates the magnitude of bias due to an unobserved
covariate that would need to be present to alter the conclusions that are reached when we
assume that random assignment of the treatment holds given the observed covariates.
To estimate an effect parameter and a one-sided conﬁdence region, we use δ0, which is a
2I-dimensional vector with elements δ0ij ∈{−1, 0, 1}. We consider hypotheses of the form H0 :
δ=δ0. There are many hypotheses of the form H0 :δ=δ0 that we could test, and it is generally
not practical to test them all. We can summarize the testing of multiple hypotheses by using
the attributable effect, which is a scalar and unobserved quantity. The attributable effect Δ=
Σi,j Zijδij is the number of votes due to the ballot initiative, so T −Δ is the number of treated
subjects who would have voted even in the absence of treatment (Rosenbaum, 2002b).
If H0 : δ= δ0 is true, we can deﬁne Δ0 =Σi,j Zijδ0ij to estimate an effect parameter for the
ballot initiative. We use the method of Hodges and Lehmann (1963) to obtain a point estimate
for Δ by equating McNemar’s statistic to its null expectation. In the case of matched binary
outcomes, we use a table of matched outcomes and adjust it until it is exactly without treatment
effect. Speciﬁcally, the effect parameter is the value ofΔ0 such that the two off-diagonal cells of
discordant pairs in the table of matched outcomes are equal to each other. The effect parameter
represents the number of votes that are attributable to the treatment, which we express as the
percentage of treated votes attributable to treatment.
We also calculate a one-sided conﬁdence set for δ by testing every H0 :δ=δ0 and retaining
compatible hypotheses that are not rejected by the test (Rosenbaum, 2002b). For example, if we
reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level if Δ0 <a and accept if Δ0 a, then a one-sided 95%
conﬁdence set for δ is the set of all δ0 that are compatible with Δ0 =ΣZijδ0ij  a. Therefore,
the 95% one-sided conﬁdence set for δ is the set of all treatment effects with at least a responses
among the subjects actually caused by the treatment.
5.2. Does turnout increase because of a ballot initiative?
For the outcome analysis, we combined the data from the two different exact legislative matches
into a single data set of matched pairs for each design. Table 2 contains cross-tabulations of
the matched pairs from each design. The table for design 1, where the matches ignore distance,
shows the counts of matched pairs—the number of discordant pairs are in the off-diagonal
cells. For design 1, there are IÅ =814+690=1504 discordant pairs, and the one-sided p-value
is calculated by comparing 814 votes among treated voters with a binomial distribution with
1504 trials andprobability 12 . If there is nohiddenbias,Γ=1, then the sharp null hypothesis of no
treatment effect is implausible as the p-value from the test is 0.0075. However, the upper bound
on the p-value is 0.046 for Γ= 1:08 and 0.067 for Γ= 1:09, which indicates that even a weak
confounder might alter our conclusions. The estimated effect is the value ofΔ0 whichmakes the
Enhancing a Geographic Regression Discontinuity Design through Matching 237
Table 2. Voting patterns in designs 1–3
Design Lived in Milwaukee
suburb, Zij =0
Did not vote, Voted,
Yij =0 Yij =1
1† Lived in Milwaukee, Zij =1 Did not vote, Yij =0 212 690
Voted, Yij =1 814 2655
2‡ Lived in Milwaukee, Zij =1 Did not vote, Yij =0 199 683
Voted, Yij =1 782 2523
3§ Lived in Milwaukee, Zij =1 Did not vote, Yij =0 118 401
Voted, Yij =1 421 1535
†The one-sided p-value from McNemar’s test is 0.008. The upper bound on the p-value is
0.046 for Γ=1:08. An estimated 124 votes are attributable to treatment with an upper bound
of 193 votes.
‡The one-sided p-value from McNemar’s test is 0.005. The upper bound on the p-value is
0.035 for Γ=1:04. An estimated 99 votes are attributable to treatment with an upper bound
of 166 votes.
§The one-sided p-value from McNemar’s test is 0.254. An estimated 30 votes are attributable
to treatment with an upper bound of 70 votes.
McNemar test statistic equal to its null distribution; this occurs when the numbers of discordant
pairs in each of the two off-diagonal cells are equal to each other. Thus, the effect estimate is
814−690=124 or 124=4371≈2:8% of the votes among the treated are attributable to the ballot
initiative. To form a conﬁdence interval, we test all hypotheses H0 : δ= δ0 and retain the set
of values of Δ0 that are not rejected at the 5% level. We ﬁnd that Δ0 = 192 attributable votes
are accepted with one-sided signiﬁcance level 0.0519, whereas 193 votes are rejected with one-
sided signiﬁcance level 0.0494. Therefore, with 95% conﬁdence, we can say that no more than
193=4371≈4:4% of the votes among the treated were due to the presence of the ballot initiative.
In design 2, using McNemar’s test, the p-value of the one-sided sharp null test is 0.0052, so
if Γ= 1 the sharp null hypothesis of no treatment effect is implausible. The upper bound on
the p-value is 0.035 for Γ= 1:04 and 0.052 for Γ= 1:05, so the effect in design 2 is even more
sensitive to bias from a hidden confounder than in design 1. In design 2, the effect indicates that
99 or 99=4187≈3:0% of the votes among the treated are attributable to the ballot initiative. In
the absence of hidden bias, all hypotheses with H0 :δ=δ0 with Δ0 =167 attributable votes are
accepted with level of signiﬁcance 0.0511. Thus, with 95% conﬁdence, nomore than 166=4187≈
3:0% of the votes among the treated were due to the treatment. In sum, the conclusions that
we draw from designs 1 and 2 are quite similar. Under both designs, we would conclude that
approximately 3% of those among the treated were caused by the presence of an initiative on the
ballot. For both of these designs, however, the sensitivity analysis indicates that these inferences
could easily be reversed by a weak confounder.
In design 3, the test of the sharp null hypothesis yields a p-value of 0.254, so, if there is no
hidden bias, it is plausible that the treatment did not cause any votes. In terms of the point
estimate, 30 or 30=2475≈ 1:2% of the votes among the treated are attributable to the ballot
initiative and, with 95% conﬁdence, no more than 71=2475≈ 2:9% of the votes among the
treated were due to treatment. Thus, on the basis of design 3, there is little evidence that ballot
initiatives caused an increase in turnout.
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6. Summary: enhancing regression discontinuity designs through matching
We use a penalized integer programme to combine two identiﬁcation strategies in a principled
manner. Our approach allows us to ﬁnd voters who are close geographically but who are also
similar in terms of observable characteristics. Matching on just distance or observables alone
produced inferior matches in terms of observed balance. Thus we can produce more compa-
rable matches while retaining as many matched pairs as possible in relation to their distances
as regulated by λ subject to balance constraints. Although our application focused on a geo-
graphic discontinuity, our method of matching could be applied to standard RD designs. To
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst application of matching methods to a discontinuity design.
We found that a ballot initiative did not increase turnout in the Milwaukee election, which
is a result that was also found by Keele and Titiunik (2013a). Using randomization inference,
we estimated that among the balanced subset of the data only 1.2% of the treated votes could
be attributed to the presence of an initiative on the ballot, but the one-sided p-value of 0.254
indicated that this point estimate is consistent with a null effect. Our results are consistent with a
previous ﬁnding in the literature that shows that ballot initiatives do not appear to have turnout
effects in presidential elections. Thus, our analysis is consistent with the thesis that initiatives
only increase turnout in midterm election years (Daniel and Yohai, 2008).
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